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In this Article, we first consider the relevant differences between antisocialpersonality disorder(ASPD) andpsychopathy. Then, we look at the meager cohort
offederal sentencingcases in which the issue ofpsychopathy is even raised, and

consider decision-makingin this contextfrom the perspective of implicit racial
bias. Next, we present some background on the controversy of "psychopathy"

diagnosis; here, we share what we call the "insidebaseball"aboutthe debateon the differences betweenpsychopathy andASPD-thathas rocked the world
of the psychology academy. We will also analyze how our current ideas about
punishment and recidivism could change by using psychopathy research as a
case study, and consider how this new research creates extra responsibilitiesfor

both lawyers and expert witnesses in their representation of criminal defendants in such cases. Specifcally, we willfocus on how the use of these terms has
a disproportionatelynegative impact on persons ofcolor, looking closely at the
way the instruments that are used to assess these conditions are subject to significant racialbias. Finally, we unpack these issues through the lens of therapeuticjurisprudence, a school ofthought that considers the extent to which the
legal system can be a therapeuticagent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminology and psychology research have devoted significant attention to individuals diagnosed with either antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), psychopathy, or both.' While in the past the terms ASPD and psychopathy were used some2
what interchangeably, and still are by some judges, expert witnesses, and lay people,
researchers today are starting to see that they in fact represent two very different
personality types and offending patterns. 3
In this Article, we examine this development from a legal perspective, considering what it might mean in terms of punishment for these two personality types
based on the different characteristics they display in their actual offenses, their responses to punishment and rehabilitation, 4 and the extent to which this has any
5
significance for sentencing decisions under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, or

' See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Stacey Shipley, The Confusion Over Psychopathy (I): Historical
J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 325, 327 (2001).
Psychopaths make up roughly 1% of the general male adult population. Kent A. Kiehl & Morris
B. Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics, 51
Considerations, 45 INT'L

JURIMETRICs 355, 377 (2011).
2 Kathleen Wayland & Sean D. O'Brien, DeconstructingAntisocial Personality Disorderand
Psychopathy: A Guidelines-BasedApproach to PrejudicialPsychiatric Labels, 42 HOFsTRA L. REv.
519, 522 (2013).
3 Eg., L.E. Drislane et al., Reduced Cortical Call to Arms Differentiates Psychopathy from
AntisocialPersonalityDisorder, 43 PSYCHOL. MED. 825, 832 (2013).
4 Eg., Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 526-27. For what is apparently the first mention
in the legal literature, see Abe Krash, The Durham Rule andJudicialAdministrationof the Insanity
Defense in the Districtof Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 926, 945-46 (1961).

5 The Guidelines were formerly mandatory, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
367 (1989), but are now advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). A
lower sentence "may be warranted" to reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity
contributed to the commission of the offense, as long as the defendant's criminal history does not
"indicate[] a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect the public[.]" U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5k2.13 (2011) [hereinafter MANUAL 2011].
See generallyMichael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen/IKnew He'd Lost Control": The Impact of
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing After the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REv. 881, 88485 (2015); MICHAEL L. PERUN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIvILAND
CRIMINAL, § 16-2 (3d ed. 2016) (2020 update).
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state laws that have adopted, in large part, the Guidelines. 6 We also seek to unpack
the ways that implicit racial bias can have an impact on sentencing decision making.
Current research estimates that one in five violent offenders can be classified as
a psychopath, 7 a term fraught with controversy,8 and one excluded from the fifth
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM V). 9
However, this category of offenders presents dramatically different characteristics
than the category of individuals with antisocial personality disorder, a characterization that is often incorrectly conflated with psychopathy. o Emerging research using
neuroimaging" is demonstrating that the brain of a psychopath responds differently
to punishment than the brains of other non-psychopathic criminal offenders.

12

As

6 See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 696, 697 (1995); Robert P. Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing
Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 82 OR. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (2003). Some states have adopted
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines almost verbatim, some have created other guidelines, and some
have no guidelines. See, e.g., Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and FederalSentencing
Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 679, 679-82 (1992) (describing
differences between the state guideline systems and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
7 Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1223 n.91 (2000).
a On the impact of media stigma on cases involving individuals characterized as
"psychopaths," see Bang Thi, The Psychopath's Double-Edged Sword: How Media Stigma Influences
Aggravatingand Mitigating Circumstancesin CapitalSentencing, 26 S. CAL. REv. L. & SOC. JUST.
173, 175-78 (2017).
This exclusion is discussed in Deborah W. Denno, What Real-World CriminalCases Tell
Us About Genetics Evidence, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1591, 1596-99 (2013).
5 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem & David J. Cooke, Is CriminalBehavior a CentralComponent
of Psychopathy? Conceptual Directionsfor Resolving the Debate, 22 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 433,
441-42 (2010).
" See, e.g., Hannah L. Bedard, The Potentialfor Bioprediction in CriminalLaw, 18 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 268, 283 (2017); see also Elizabeth Ford & Neil Aggarwal, Neuroethics of
FunctionalNeuroimagingin the Courtroom, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM
THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 325, 334 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012) ("One can easily
imagine the introduction of neuroimaging evidence about psychopathy to aid in the prediction of
future dangerousness. Will the police request a warrant to search your brain?") (footnote omitted);
Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Reduz, 31 L. & INEQ. 509, 512 (2013) ("Despite the
astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other neuroscientific methods, we still do not have
sophisticated causal knowledge of how the brain works generally, and we have little information
that is legally relevant.").
12 E g., R.J.R. Blair, Subcortical Brain Systems in Psychopathy: The Amygdala and Associated
Structures, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 296, 298 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006). One
must be aware of the limitations of neuroimaging. "[A] person's brain and his environment work
together to form his behavior-the brain alone is not determinative." Ellen G. Koenig, A Fair
Trial: When the Constitution Requires Attorneys to Investigate Their Clients'Brains, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 177, 198 (2013); see also id. at 198-99 ("[A] fully functioning 'normal' person may have
a brain that looks the same as a sociopath's."). There is still so much not known about the
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the philosophers Luca Malatesti and John McMillan have noted, "psychopaths appear to have deficits in a type of instrumental learning that involves learning both
to respond to stimuli that give rise to reward and to avoid responding to stimuli that
give rise to punishment." 13
As research continues, it is critical for attorneys, mental health professionals,
judges, forensic witnesses, criminologists, and criminal justice scholars to begin
thinking about the extent to which brain science should affect our modern views of
punishment, and whether individuals should be punished in different ways based
on their diagnosis or neurophysiology.14 This is not a topic that has been the subject
of substantial contemporaneous legal analysis, and we hope that this Article invig-

orates the conversation. 15

relationship between psychopathy and certain behaviors. See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., Relation
ofAntisocial and Psychopathic Traits to Suicide-RelatedBehavior Among Offenders, 32 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 511, 512 (2008) ("Scant empirical work has examined the relation between psychopathy
and suicidal behavior.").
Defending PCL-R, in RESPONSIBILITY AND
&

1 Luca Malatesti & John McMillan,

PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY 79, 85 (Luca Malatesti

John McMillan eds., 2010). Psychopaths also are impaired in some forms of associative learning,
particularly stimulus-reinforcement learning. See D.G.V. Mitchell et al., InstrumentalLearning
and Relearningin Individuals with Psychopathyand in Patients with Lesions Involving the Amygdala
or OrbitofrontalCortex, 20 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 280, 287-88 (2006).
4 See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The False PromiseofAdolescent Brain Science in JuvenileJustice,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 127 (2009) (noting "most adult-punishment challenges referencing
brain science have failed"). On the use of recent developments in brain science in juvenile policy
reform, see generally Jennifer Skeem et al., Justice Policy Reform for High-Risk Juveniles: Using
Science to Achieve Large-Scale Crime Reduction, 10 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 709 (2014). In
an earlier article, Skeem and other colleagues noted that, "[i]n U.S. and Canadian courts,
diagnoses of psychopathy also are being used to justify decisions to try and sentence juvenile
offenders in the adult criminal justice system, typically based on the presumption that
psychopathy is untreatable." Jennifer Skeem et al., Psychopathic Personality and Racial/Ethnic
Differences Reconsidered:A Reply to Lynn (2002), 35 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
1439, 1455 (2003) [hereinafter Skeem et al., Psychopathic Personality] (citing, inter alia, Ivan
Zinger & Adelle E. Forth, Psychopathy and Canadian Criminal Proceedings: The Potentialfor
Human RightsAbuses, 40 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 237, 255 (1998)).
15 Beyond the scope of this Article, but of great significance, is the way that the psychopathy
construct is increasingly being applied as a predictor of dangerousness. See, e.g., John R. Anderson
et al., Psychopathy, Self-Identifed Race/Ethnicity, and Nonviolent Recidivism: A LongitudinalStudy,
42 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 531, 532 (2018); David DeMatteo & John F. Edens, The Role and
Relevance of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court: A Case Law Survey of US. Courts (19912004), 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 214, 219-20, 226 (2006); Lisa Ells, Juvenile Psychopathy:
The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 158, 182-83 (2005); Zach Walsh,
Psychopathy and Criminal Violence: The ModeratingEffect ofEthnicity, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 303,
303 (2013); Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 545.
This has been most prominent in assessments of whether certain individuals convicted of sex
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In this Article, we first consider the relevant differences between ASPD and
psychopathy. Then, we look at the meager cohort of federal sentencing cases in
which the issue of psychopathy is even raised, and consider decision making in this
context from the perspective of implicit racial bias. Next, we present some background on the controversy of "psychopathy" diagnosis; here, we share what we call
the "inside baseball" about the debate-on the differences between psychopathy and
ASPD-that has rocked the world of psychology academy. We will also analyze how
our current ideas about punishment and recidivism could change by using psychopathy research as a case study and consider how this new research creates extra responsibilities for both lawyers and expert witnesses in their representation of criminal defendants in such cases. Specifically, we will focus on how the use of these terms
has a disproportionately negative impact on persons of color, looking closely at the
way the instruments that are used to assess these conditions are subject to significant
racial bias. Finally, we unpack these issues through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence, a school of thought that considers the extent to which the legal system can
be a therapeutic agent.
The title of this Article comes from Anthony Burgess's A Clockwork Orange.16
There, Burgess captured the mindset of someone who could "fit" the psychopath
profile: an individual who very clearly can make determinations about right and
wrong and can understand his behavior in the context of society, but consciously
chooses to do the opposite." In practice, this is the type of defendant for whom
punishment becomes a difficult task. Can this kind of person be rehabilitated? In
Burgess's novel, the main character, Alex, is subject to a series of brutal "re-education" techniques to try and "set him straight."
We emphatically are not advocating for any dystopian retributivist schemes,
but we are interested in questions of whether new scientific discoveries can help
devise a way to treat individuals who present with Alex-like psychopathic tendencies.
Can we teach someone to know what is right and act on that instead? And can we
do it in a way that is free of racial bias?

offenses are likely to be "sexually violent predators." See, e.g., John Q. La Fond, Washington's
Sexually Violent PredatorLaw: A DeliberateMisuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15
U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 655, 655 (1992); Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowingthe Future ofKansas v.
Hendricks: Lessons from Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92 Nw. U. L. REv.
1279, 1283 (1998). Importantly, psychopathic traits are required to be assessed in some states
during civil commitment evaluations of sexually violent predators. See Daniel C. Murrie et al.,
Does Interrater(Dis)Agreement on Psychopathy Checklist Scores in Sexually Violent Predator Trials
Suggest PartisanAllegiance in Forensic Evaluations?, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 352, 354 (2008). On
the use of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) in such cases, see infra text accompanying
note 122.
ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).
17 Id. at 8-13.
'G
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II. BACKGROUND ON CONTROVERSY OF "PSYCHOPATHY"
DIAGNOSIS
Psychopathy does not appear in any iteration of the DSM. 18 The DSM does
include a diagnosis for antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). One key diagnostic
threshold for ASPD according to the DSM is habitually violating the rights of others
without remorse, 19 but again, the DSM does not include a definition of "psychopathy." Importantly, however, psychopathy as a diagnosis is often conflated with an20
tisocial personality disorder by laypeople, expert witnesses, judges and lawyers. A
commentary on the most recent version of the DSM, by way of example, notes:
"The terms psychopathy or sociopathy are also used, in some contexts synonymously, in others, sociopath is differentiated from a psychopath, in that a sociopathy
21
is rooted in environmental causes, while psychopathy is genetically based." However, the two descriptors actually imply different offending styles and mindsets.

18 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19

AM.

PSYCHIATRIC

ASS'N,

DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL

MANUAL OF

MENTAL

DISORDERS 559 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5); see Gillian Bendelow, EthicalAspects of
Personality Disorders, 23 CURR. OPINION PSYCHIATRY 546, 547 (2010) (noting personality
disorders lie "on the contested boundaries between mental illness and social deviance").
20 See, e.g., State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 245 n.3 (N.Y. 2014) ("[B]oth experts
opined that Donald DD. suffered from an extreme form of ASPD known as psychopathy."). For
an in-depth discussion of this case, see generally Kaitlyn Walsh, Antisocial PersonalityDisorderand
Donald DD.: Distinguishingthe Sex Offenderfrom the Typical Recidivist in the Civil Commitment
ofSex Offenders, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 867 (2017). For other examples of psychopathy/antisocial
personality disorder conflation, see also State v. Williams, 31 N.Y.S.3d 362, 364-65 (2016)
("Petitioner's experts also diagnosed respondent with psychopathy, which they described as a
condition wherein respondent has the traits of ASPD to an extreme degree."); State v. Kareem
M., No. 30006/2014, slip op. at *32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2016) (explaining "the diagnosis of
ASPD with psychopathy is not materially different from the diagnosis of ASPD alone").
"
David Porter, Antisocial Personality Disorder DSM-5 301.7 (F60.2), THERAVIVE,
https://www.theravive.com/therapedia/antisocial-personality-disorder-dsm--5-301.7-(f60.2) (last
visited May 26, 2021). On the improper conflation of psychopathy and sociopathy, see generally
Stephen H. Dinwiddie, Psychopathy Versus Sociopathy, 45 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 165 (2015). For
examples differentiating sociopathy and psychopathy, see William Waller, "Criminal"Insanity,
Diagnosis, and PublicMorality, 4 WASH. U. JURIS. REv. 183, 184 n.3 (2011) (quoting Maya MeiTal, The Criminal Responsibility of Psychopathic Offenders, 36 ISR. L. REv. 103, 105 (2002))
("Some of the psychiatric literature notes different connotations for sociopathy and psychopathy:
for instance, sociopathy describes a behavioral disorder found in the DSM, whereas psychopathy
'emphasizes personality traits, such as lack of empathy."'); see also Anthony Walsh & Huei-Hsia
Wu, Differentiating Antisocial Personality Disorder, Psychopathy, and Sociopathy: Evolutionary,
Genetic, Neurological, and Sociological Considerations, 21 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 135, 135 (2008)
("[P]sychopaths are a stable proportion of any population, can be from any segment of society,
may constitute a distinct taxonomical class forged by frequency-dependent natural selection, and
that the muting of the social emotions is the proximate mechanism that enables psychopaths to
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Also, any discussion of these descriptors must confront the nature/nurture dilemma
that has befuddled scholars and mental health professionals for decades. 22
A. Differences Between Conduct Disorder/ASPDand Psychopathy
While not often discussed publicly in the context of cases, convictions, or layperson analysis of the interplay between law and mental health, there are distinctions
that must be made between the DSM-5 diagnosis of sociopathy, and the less clinically-recognized labeling of psychopathy.
Both are a form of antisocial personality disorder, according to the American
Psychiatric Association in its DSM-5 manual. 23 These disorders share the following
traits: propensity for violence, a remorseless mind, indifference to others' rights and
25
not caring about ethical behavior or laws. 24 But, there are differences, and per
Professor Stephen Morse, "[p]sychopathy must be distinguished from Antisocial
Personality Disorder." 26 The terms "represent distinct concepts that are frequently
(and erroneously) used interchangeably."

27

As we have noted in a recent article, "the term 'psychopath' has a confusing,
muddled history in clinical psychology and psychiatry[,] [and is] [o]ften conflated

&

pursue their self-centered goals without feeling the pangs of guilt. Sociopaths are more the
products of adverse environmental experiences that affect autonomic nervous system and
neurological development."). On how sociopaths do have "a sense of morality," see Jack Pemment,
Psychopathy Versus Sociopathy: Why the Distinction Has Become Crucial, 18 AGGRESSION
VIOLENT BEHAV. 458, 459 (2013).
22 For a sampling of the literature, see, for example, Niccol Kording, Nature v. Nurture:
Children Left Fatherlessand Family-Less when Nature Prevails in PaternityActions, 65 U. PITr. L.
REv. 811 (2004); Jane Rutherford,Juvenile Justice CaughtBetween The Exorcist andA Clockwork
Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 715 (2002); Justin Schwartz, It Ain't Necessarily So: The Misuse of
"Human Nature"in Law and Social Policy and the Bankruptcy of the "Nature-Nurture"Debate, 21
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 187 (2012); Robert Plomin & Kathryn Asbury, Nature and Nurture: Genetic
and EnvironmentalInfluences on Behavior, 600 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. SC. 86 (2005).
23 Richard P. Conti, Psychopathy, Sociopathy, andAntisocialPersonalityDisorder, 2 FORENSIC
RES. & CRIMINOLOGY INT'L J. 53,53 (2016).
2
Kristy A. Fisher & Manassa Hany, Antisocial Personality Disorder, STATPEARLS (Dec. 8,

2020), https://www.ncbi.nm.nih.gov/books/NBK546673/.
25 See, e.g., Abraham L. Halpern, The Insanity Verdict, the Psychopath, and Post-Acquittal
Confinement, 24 PAC. L.J. 1125, 1140 n.68 (1993) ("Antisocial Personality Disorder criteria do
not distinguish the callous, remorseless, and manipulative psychopath from other antisocial
individuals."). Dr. Halpern wrote this when a prior version of DSM was being used.
26 Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: Desert/DiseaseJurisprudence, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1077, 1095 (2011).
" Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 547; see also Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the
Legal Meaning and Signifcance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 534, 566 (1995)
("People with what is now known as antisocial personality disorder previously were called
sociopaths, psychopaths, or moral imbeciles.").
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with antisocial personality disorder." 28 This conflation has created much of the dilemma we face today. We explore this confusion in the next Section.
B. ClinicalPresentationsofSociopathy and Psychopathy
There is a great deal more known about the diagnosis of sociopathy, since it
has appeared in past iterations of the DSM, all the way up through and including
the current edition. While there is some conflation between sociopathy and psychopathy in clinical literature, the DSM is very clear about what it requires in order
for the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder to be made.
Antisocial Personality Disorder is defined as:
a deeply ingrained and rigid dysfunctional thought process that focuses on
social irresponsibility with exploitive, delinquent, and criminal behavior with
no remorse. Disregard for and the violation of others' rights are common
manifestations of this personality disorder, which displays symptoms that include failure to conform to the law, inability to sustain consistent employment, deception, manipulation for personal gain, and incapacity to form stable relationships. 29
Antisocial personality disorder falls into Cluster B in DSM-5's categorization
of personality disorders. 30 Others included in that cluster are borderline, narcissistic,
and histrionic.31 Tellingly, all of these disorders characteristically present with "dra32
matic, emotional, and unpredictable interactions with others." Of particular interest for purposes of this Article, antisocial personality disorder is the only one that
cannot be diagnosed in childhood. 33 This may be due to research about the organic
locus of many behaviors that can manifest as part of ASPD, and a better understanding of the changes that a juvenile brain goes through (potentially even mimicking
criteria for an ASPD diagnosis) before full frontal lobe development around age
25.34 In fact, recent examination of what is known about the neurological correlates
2
See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind": Criminology,
Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM L. 304, 336 n.105 (2016). On this
conflation, see also Norman Poythress et al., Identifying Subtypes Among Offenders with Antisocial
Personality Disorder:A Cluster-Analytic Study, 119 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 389, 390 (2010).
29 Fisher & Hany, supranote 24; see also Donald W. Black, The NaturalHistory ofAntisocial
Personality Disorder,60 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 309, 309 (2015).
" Fisher & Hany, supra note 24.
31

Id.

32

Id.; see also Darryl A. Regier et al., The DSM-5: Classification and Criteria Changes, 12

WORLD PSYCHIATRY 92, 94 (2013).
3 Denise Schipani, Conduct Disorder in Children, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.everydayhealth.com/antisocial-personality-disorder/conduct-disorder-children/.
3
On juvenile brain development in the context of criminal sentencing, see Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Some Mother's ChildHas Gone Astray": Neuroscienti/cApproaches to a
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of ASPD have led some researchers to argue that individuals with ASPD must be
characterized both biologically and cognitively in order to ensure a more accurate
and appropriate diagnosis and treatment. 3 5
As this research continues to develop, it appears clear that many agree both
genetic and environment factors have been found to have a part in the development
of ASPD. There have been studies on heritability-some estimating that it could be
up to 69% heritable 36 -as well as environmental factors such as abuse, neglect, and
other adverse childhood experiences. 3
Biological research has picked up on pinpointing potentially contributing
genes, with some studies reviewing genetic and environmental interactions as a factor, 38 and others looking more towards specific genetic factors. 39 Research has begun
to parse out more specific characteristics for both groups, finding that there are important distinctions to be made, both based on diagnosable symptoms as well as
neurology. Importantly, research devoted to studying psychopathy has branched out
on its own and has separated from research on ASPD,40 so it is important to understand these distinctions that have emerged.
The DSM-V states that "deceit and manipulation are [also] central features" of
ASPD, which is further characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard for the

TherapeuticJurisprudenceModel offuvenile Sentencing, FAM. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
3 Inti A. Brazil et al., Classificationand Treatment of Antisocial Individuals: From Behavior
to Biocognition, 91 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAv. REV. 259, 273 (2018).
36 Amy Smith, What isAntisocialPersonalityDisorder?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/320142.
37 Matt DeLisi et al., The Etiology of Antisocial PersonalityDisorder: The DifferentialRoles of
Adverse Childhood Experiences and ChildhoodPsychopathology, 92 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 1,
1(2019).
38 David E. Comings, Both Genes and Environment Play a Role in Antisocial Behavior, 15
POL. & LIFE SCI. 84, 84 (1996).
3 Research has turned toward the 2p12 region of chromosome 2, and variation within
AVPR1A as specific genetic contributions. Iro Fragkaki et al., Oxytocin Receptor Gene (OXTR) and
Deviant Peer Affiliation: A Gene-Environment Interaction in Adolescent Antisocial Behavior, 48 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 86, 86 (2019). There has been a great amount of research focused on

the environmental factors that might lead to a propensity to develop ASPD. See, e.g., Tom
Rosenstr6m et al., Genetic and Environmental Structure of DSM-V Criteria for Antisocial
Personality Disorder:A Twin Study, 47 BEHAV. GENETICS 265, 272 (2017). However, in order to

embrace a fuller, complete understanding of the diagnosis and its exact effects, both through
neurology and observable behavior, it is equally important to understand the genetic
predispositions that may be at play. See, e.g., M-R Rautiainen et al., Genome-Wde Association

Study ofAntisocial PersonalityDisorder,TRANSLATIONAL PSYCHIATRY, 2016, at 8.
* See, e.g., Kate Kelland, Study Finds Psychopaths Have Distinct Brain Structure, REUTERS
(May 7, 2012, 1:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brains-psychopaths/study-findspsychopaths-have-distinct-brain-structure-idUSBRE8460ZQ20120507.
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4
rights of other people that often manifests as hostility and/or aggression. ' However,
while the psychopath does not experience feelings of remorse for these behaviors,
someone with ASPD may be capable of feeling guilt or regret (even though he will
continue to violate social norms without hesitation if it serves his own desire or
purpose). 42 Someone with true psychopathic traits has these characteristics "and
more." 43 Features of psychopathic personality also include a strong need for stimulation, a complete lack of remorse or guilt (rather than a lack of respect for the rec-

ognized rights of others that may be violated), cunning and manipulativeness, and
a "[p]arasitic lifestyle."44 Psychopaths are impulsive, self-centered, aggressive, and
opportunistic. Tedium and routine are "unendurable," which leads to increasingly
risky behaviors in order to alleviate boredom and find pleasure in the thrill of po45
tentially dangerous consequences.
46
Some describe a sociopath as the rudimentary or undeveloped psychopath.
Psychopaths, by this view, simply cannot form emotional bonds with other humans. 47 They lack empathy entirely, 48 but they can trick people into thinking they
are capable of making complex emotional connections based on their intelligence

4'
42

DSM-5, supra note 19, at 659.
Pamela R. Perez, The Etiology of Psychopathy: A Neuropsychological Perspective, 17

AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 519, 520 (2012).

4

Id.

4

DAVID T. LYKKEN, THE ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITIES 126 (1995).

4 Laurence Miller, Neuropsychology of the Aggressive Psychopath:An Integrative Review, 13
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 119, 119 (1987).
46 See, e.g., Robert Siciliano, Psychopath vs. Sociopath: What's the Difference?, HUFFPOST
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-is-a-sociopath b_5877160.
47 On the ways that prosecutors label defendants as psychopaths so as to convey to jurors
that they are somehow not "fully human," see Robert J. Smith, ForgettingFurman, 100 IOWA L.

&

REV. 1149, 1190 n.251 (2015).
48 "[Psychopaths] possess an acute lack of empathy, as well as a diminished capacity for
aversive conditioning that would ordinarily suppress aggressive behavior." Adam R. Fox et al.,
Psychopathy and Culpability:How Responsible Is the Psychopathfor Criminal Wrongdoing?, 38 L.
SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7 (2013) (citing R.J.R. Blair, Applying a Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective to the
DisorderofPsychopathy, 17 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 865, 875 (2005)); see also M. Eve Hanan,
Remorse Bias, 83 Mo. L. REV. 301, 311 (2018) (citing RICHARD WEISMAN, SHOWING REMORSE:
LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF EMOTION 60 (2014)) ("A psychopathic person is
characterized, in part, as someone who does not feel '[r]emorse, shame, empathy, or guilt' for his
misdeeds."). For the neurological perspective on empathy, see Elayne E. Greenberg, BridgingOur
Justice Gap with Empathic Processes that Change Hearts, Expand Minds About Implicit
Discrimination, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 441, 458 (2017).
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and ability to manipulate. 49 Similar to the protagonist of the Burgess book, they see
what is right, but choose to do the opposite. 50
Recent research reveals some other subtle differences. A study by Dr. N.C. Venables and his colleagues found that boldness is central to diagnostic conceptions of
psychopathy and distinguishes psychopathy from the more prevalent diagnosis of
ASPD. 51 Dr. James Blair and his colleagues distinguish between those who suffer
from Conduct Disorder or Antisocial Personality Disorder (also known as "functional psychopaths") and the smaller class of "real" psychopaths, whose disorder has
a neurobiological underpinning.5 2 At least one study has concluded that the "boldness concept is viewed as an important component of psychopathy, particularly
53
among professionals who work directly with offender populations."
Additionally, research into psychopathy has shown that psychopaths have re55
duced gray matter in their frontal lobes, 54 increased striatal volume, abnormal
57
asymmetry in the hippocampus, 56 a larger corpus callosum, abnormal activity in

4
On "[a]wareness of psychopaths' purported skills at deceiving people in the community,"
see Norman G. Poythress et al., The Relationship Between Psychopathic Personality Featuresand
MalingeringSymptoms of Major Mental Illness, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 567, 568 (2001).

5

BURGESS, supra note 16, at 13.

N.C. Venables et al., DifferentiatingPsychopathy from Antisocial Personality Disorder:A
TriarchicModel Perspective, 44 PSYCHOL. MED. 1005, 1012 (2014); see also Jason R. Hall et al.,
Development and Validation of Triarchic Construct Scales from the Psychopathic Personality
Inventory, 26 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 447, 458 (2014) (noting "boldness may play a role in
differentiating psychopathy from ASPD"); Tina D. Wall et al., Boldness Explains a Key Difference
Between Psychopathy andAntisocial PersonalityDisorder,22 PSYCHIATRY PSYCIH OL. & L. 94 (2015)
5'

(same).
52 Lene Bomann-Larsen, Revisionism and Desert, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1, 13, n.20 (2010)
(citing JAMES BLAIR ET AL., THE PSYCHOPATH EMOTION AND THE BRAIN 16-17 (2005)).

5 Karolina S6rman et al., Boldness and Its Relation to Psychopathic Personality:Prototypicality
Analyses Among Forensic Mental Health, CriminalJustice, and Layperson Raters, 40 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 337,337 (2016).
5 Jiirgen L. Muller et al., Gray Matter Changes in Right Superior Temporal Gyrus in Criminal
Psychopaths. Evidencefrom Voxel-Based Morphometry, 163 PSYCHIATRY RES. 213 (2008); Yaling
Yang et al., MorphologicalAlterations in the Prefrontal Cortex and the Amygdala in Unsuccessful
Psychopaths, 119 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 546 (2010).
5
Andrea L. Glenn et al., Increased Volume of Striatum in Psychopathic Individuals, 67
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 52 (2010).
5

Mikko P. Laakso et al., Psychopathy and the PosteriorHippocampus, 118 BEHAV. BRAIN

RES. 187 (2001).

57 Adrian Raine et al., Corpus Callosum Abnormalities in PsychopathicAntisocial Individuals,
60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1134 (2003).
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59
the anterior cingulate cortex, 58 and deformations within the amygdala. Many of
these abnormalities are associated with interruptions to development in early stages

of life.
Many theories already exist for development of antisocial behavior patterns
based on childhood abuse and trauma. However, researchers are still investigating
how and why individuals develop psychopathic, rather than sociopathic, patterns of
behavior.
While some researchers believe that psychopathy is the result of faulty brain
"wiring," more and more experts are beginning to claim that sociopathy is the result
of "bad upbringing." 60 Since "genetics" is not responsible for sociopathy, these individuals do possess the ability to empathize and love, but with more limited capacity. As more is learned about the differences between the two disorders, it is even
more important to continue distinguishing them in research and in devising appropriate punishment structures for these individuals.
A discussion of the technical neurological differences, however, must be contextualized in the background about the history of psychopathy as a diagnosis, and
the tension that has played out behind the scenes in the research that now centers
around how psychopathy is to be assessed.
In the next Section, we turn to the interrelationship between the designation
of psychopathy, sentencing standards, and questions of racial bias.

'

6
III. PSYCHOPATHY, FEDERAL SENTENCING, AND ISSUES OF RACE

There can no longer be any question that issues of race are essential in efforts
to understand criminal sentencing. A slew of studies make clear that, despite federal
62
sentencing guidelines intended to eliminate disparities in sentencing, unexplained
63
disparities in sentencing lengths exist between defendants of different races, and

58

Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by CriminalPsychopaths

as Revealed by FunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 SoC'Y BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677
(2001).
5
'

Id.
E g., Mary Elizabeth Putnick, The State as Parent: Using Attachment Theory to Develop

Child Welfare Policy in the Best Interestof the Child, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 419, 439
(1998) (stating that attachment researchers have found "that the disruption of relationships in
childhood is a significant predictor of... sociopathic personality"); Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed
Mitigation: Counsel'sEvolving Duty to Assess and PresentMitigation at DeathPenalty Sentencing, 43
CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 15 (2007) ("Counsel should not accept a psychological designation that his
client is sociopathic, without further investigation of his childhood history.").
"

Text accompanying notes 66-90 infra is partially adapted from PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra

note 5, 5 16-2.
62 See infra note 70.
63 See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial Ethnic and Gender Disparitiesin Sentencing: Evidence
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that the guidelines may even contribute to racial disparities."M As Professor Mark
Osler has pointed out, "racial bias moves freely and unobserved, abetted by the operation of mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines triggered by prosecutors' choices." 65 What, then, is the "back story" on the creation of these guidelines,
and how does all this relate to the designation of a criminal defendant as a "psychopath"?
In response to criticisms of indeterminate sentencing, 66 Congress passed the
1984 Sentencing Reform Act, 67 in an attempt to bring about a measure of regularity
and uniformity in federal sentencing procedures. 68 Under this law, a Sentencing
Commission was created, 69 which was mandated to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the Act. 7 0 The constitutionality of these Guidelines-a
binding set of rules that courts must use in imposing sentences71-was initially upheld by the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States.72
Under the Guidelines, a sentencing court initially was allowed to depart from
the prescribed ranges where "the defendant committed the offense while suffering
from significantly reduced mental capacity" not resulting from voluntary use of

from the US. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & EcON. 285 (2001).
( See, e.g., Jennifer Skeem et al., Impact of Risk Assessment on Judges'Fairnessin Sentencing
Relatively Poor Defendants, 44 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 51, 52 (2020) (citing Richard S. Frase, What
Explains PersistentRacialDisproportionalityin Minnesota's Prison andJailPopulations?, 38 CRIME
& JUST. 201 (2009)); Ryan D. King & Michael T. Light, Have Racial and Ethnic Disparitiesin
SentencingDeclined?, 48 CRIME & JUST. 365, 416-17 (2019) ("Mandatory minimum statutes and
sentencing guidelines may encode racial biases[.]").
'* Mark Osler, Short ofthe Mountaintop: Race Neutrality, CriminalLaw, and the Jericho Road
Ahead, 49 U. MEM. L. REv. 77, 79 (2018).
" See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1989) (discussing sentencing
disparities).
67 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(b), 3742 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 998 (1988). See generally
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not
Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833 (1992).
6 Subsequently, Congress has passed the First Step Act to reduce federal prison sentences
for certain types of nonviolent offenses by curbing the use of mandatory-minimum sentences and
expanding early-release options for prisoners who complete rehabilitative programs in prison. See
generally First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.). This law has been characterized-we believe in an accurate way-by a
retired appellate court judge in Massachusetts as "modest in its reach." See James F. McHugh III,
A Smarter Path to Public Safety, 100 MAss. L. REv. 81, 82 (2019).
7°

See 28 U.S.C. § 991.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1988).

71

See id. Under the Act, a series of permissible sentencing ranges is created for each federal

69

criminal offense. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)-(2) (1988).
72 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). See generally, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel,
Foreword: StructuringSentencing Discretion: The New FederalSentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883 (1990).
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drugs or other intoxicants. 73 In such cases, a lower sentence "may be warranted" to
reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, as long as the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a
74
need for incarceration to protect the public.
In April 1998, the Guidelines were amended to read:
A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced
mental capacity. However, the court may not depart below the applicable
guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by
the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances
of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public because the
offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence; or (3) the defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant or
protect the public. If a departure is warranted, the extent of the departure
should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to
the commission of the offense. 75
The 1998 amendments also re-defined "reduced mental capacity" to include
volitional as well as cognitive impairments. Under the amended Guidelines: "'Significantly reduced mental capacity' means the defendant, although convicted, has a
significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior
comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason, or (B) control behavior
76
that the defendant knows is wrongful."
The Feeney Amendment further limited the circumstances under which a court
77
can depart from the range of sentences prescribed in the Guidelines. Among other
restrictions, the amendment limits departures based on aberrant behavior and physical impairment. 78 The amendment also prohibits departures based on diminished
79
capacity in cases involving crimes against children and sexual offenses. In general,

73 MANUAL 2011, supra note 5, at 5k2.13.
7

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5k2.13 (1998)

(hereinafter MANUAL 1998]. See generally Kirk D. Houser, Downward Departures: The Lower
Envelope of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 361, 387 n.207 (1993); Donald
C. Wayne, Chaotic Sentencing: Downward Departures Based on Extraordinary Family
Circumstances, United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992), 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 443,

447 (1993).
75 MANUAL 1998, supranote 74, at 5k2.13.
76

Id. at 5k2.13 n.1.

77 See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of
ProsecutorialPower to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295 (2004).
78 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES %§ 5K2.20, 5K2.22 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003)
[hereinafter MANUAL 2003].

79 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (2003); MANUAL 2003, supra note 78, %§ 5K2.0(b).
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the amendment prohibits departures based on factors that are not enumerated in
the Guidelines or on combinations of factors which would not independently warrant a departure. 80 Great discretion is vested in the trial courts in determining when
a sentence reduction is appropriate under the Guidelines, 8 1 and decisions not to
depart from the Guidelines are generally not appealable. 82 Only where it appears
that the District Court misunderstood its authority to reduce the defendant's sen83
tence will appellate courts be willing to disturb sentencing determinations.
Subsequent judicial developments radically altered Federal Sentencing Guideline practice. First, in Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court struck down the
Washington state sentencing guidelines as unconstitutional. 84 In B/akely, the Supreme Court applied its earlier ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 85 to hold that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by a sentencing
scheme that allowed a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum
based on facts neither admitted by the defendant nor found beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury. 86
In its next term, a deeply-divided Supreme Court then ruled in United States
v. Booker and UnitedStates v. Fanfan,87 that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
subject to jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and that the Sixth
Amendment's requirement that the jury find certain sentencing facts were incompatible with the Federal Sentencing Act, thus requiring severance of the Act's provisions that made guidelines "mandatory."88 Sentencing judges must consider (1)

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (2003); MANUAL 2003, supra note 78, 44 5K2.0(b).
See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650, 654-55 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. White, 71 F.3d 920, 922 (D.C. Cit. 1995); United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63
(6th Cit. 1995); United States v. Moreland, No. 96-30164, slip op. (9th Cir. July 21, 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 962 (1997); United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87-88, 93 (E.D.N.Y.
1999), aff'd in part & dismissed in part, 224 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Ghannam, 899 F.2d 327, 328 (4th Cit. 1990); United States v.
Follett, 905 F.2d 195, 197 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991). Compare id. at
197 (Heaney, J., dissenting), with United States v. Patterson, 15 F.3d 169, 170 (11th Cit. 1994),
and United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1990) (reversing the trial
court's refusal to depart from Guidelines in case where the defendant had the mental capacity of
12-year-old). On the need for specific findings in Guideline decision-making, see, e.g., United
States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1527-28 (D.C. Cit. 1992); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d
911, 923-24 (2d Cit. 1993).
84 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
85 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
80
"

6

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.

17 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005).
8
Id. at 245. Compare United States v. Sam, 467 F.3d 857, 860-61 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting
Booker requires court to consider and apply the Guidelines, but Guidelines are no longer
mandatory), with United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (Under Booker, the
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offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic
aims of sentencing, namely, (a) "just punishment" (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c)
incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution. 89 At least one commentator has read Booker to make it "incumbent upon judges to consider the physical or
mental health of a defendant during the sentencing phase, where it ordinarily would
not have been allowed pre-Booker when the Guidelines were mandatory." 90
What impact do these developments have on the sentencing of defendants
deemed to be "psychopaths"? 91 To our amazement, only a handful of federal cases
discuss the categorization, 92 and some merely in passing. 93

Court of Appeals held, "[w]e lack authority to review a sentencing court's denial of a downward
departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so").
89 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003), as discussed in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338
(2007).
9 Natalie Hinton, Curing the BOP Plague with Booker: Addressing Inadequate Medical
Treatment in the Bureau of Prisons, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 219, 228 (2007).
' Similarly, adult offenders have been denied admission into treatment programs because
they have been deemed psychopathic. See, e.g., Skeem et al., PsychopathicPersonality, supra note
14, at 1455; United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 895 (4th Cit. 1998) (quoting transcript of the
death penalty phase of the trial).
92 State cases generally make no significant distinction between ASPD and psychopathy.
Eg., State v. Michael R., No. 30237-2012, slip op. at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2014) (An expert
testified that the defendant "was psychopathic which he defined using many of the characteristics
of a person with ASPD."); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lungin, 77 Pa. D. & C.4th 267, 330
(2005); Allred v. State, 186 So. 3d 530, 536 (Fla. 2016). Cf State v. Jerome A., No. 30261-2014,
slip op. at 1, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015), rev'd, 27 N.Y.S.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 15,
2016) ("[Examining psychologist] interviewed Mr. A. for three hours on October 3, 2014 by
video teleconference. She prepared a report of her evaluation dated October 17, 2014. She
concluded that Mr. A. suffers from a Mental Abnormality under Article 10 and diagnosed him
with ASPD with psychopathy. Dr. Charder opined that although the courts had found that ASPD
alone was not a qualifying condition, disease or disorder under Article 10, it was such a qualifying
condition. She said that psychopathy was a 'condition' and believed it would eventually be
categorized as a disease. Dr. Charder outlined the diagnostic criteria for each condition in her
written report.").
" For example, in Kozohorsky v. United States, No. 1:14CV00046 SNLJ, 2014 WL
4681315, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19, 2014), a re-sentencing application, the court merely noted
that the defendant-convicted of failing to register as a sex offender-treated the categories of
psychopathy and anti-social jointly: "According to a Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment
... 'this offender appears to have a deviant sexual preoccupation or paraphilia (rape) and other
personality characteristics (psychopathic, antisocial, sadistic) predisposing him to repeated,
wanton, disregard of major social norms as well as violent sexual assault of others."'; see also United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 2010) (An expert testified that defendant was "not
generally anti-social or psychopathic in his psychological makeup[.]"). In United States v.
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Only one subsequent case appears to be relevant to the focus of this Article: in
United States v. Fell,94 an expert witness (retained by the government to assess the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the murders with which he was charged)
had administered the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), 95 the Violent Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG), and the Historical/Clinical/Risk Management (HCR20)96 to assess Fell's capacity for future violence, concluding that the defendant was

Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1161 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014), the court ruled that the grounds upon which a sentencing
judge deemed to disfavor downward departure-the trial judge's extensive comments on the
defendant's "recidivism and psychopathic tendencies"-may not invariably be equated with those
that would merit such an upward departure. More recently, in Dallas v. Dunn, No. 2:02-CV777-WKW, 2017 WL 3015690, at *12 n.57 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2017) the court denied the
petitioner's application for a reconsideration of a habeas corpus petition, in which it was alleged
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "present expert testimony showing the likely causes
of Petitioner's emotional and physical problems [('serious psychopathology including confused
thinking, distorted perceptions, and other psychotic processes')]."
" United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 226 (2d Cir. 2008), post-conviction reliefgrantedon
other grounds, United States v. Fell, No. 2:01-cr-12, 2014 WL 3697810, at *40 (D. Vt. July 24,
2014).

See infra text accompanying notes 124-46.
The use of such risk assessment tools in general is not without controversy. See, e.g.,
Michael Vitiello, PunishingSex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651,
678-79 (2008). See generally Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutionaland Ethical
Challenges, 52 AM. CIuM. L. REv. 231, 233 (2015). Recently, significant attention has been paid
to the role of algorithms-in many ways, the heart of these risk assessment tools. See Cassie
Deskus, Fifth Amendment Limitations on CriminalAlgorithmic Decision-Making, 21 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 237, 237 (2018); see also Kevin S. Douglas & Jennifer L. Skeem, Violence
Risk Assessment: Getting Speckfc About Being Dynamic, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 347, 352
(2005) (demonstrating how actuarial instruments use a mechanistic algorithm to combine heavily
weighted static variables relevant to making ultimate determination of risk); Solon Barocas
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's DisparateImpact, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 671, 671 (2016) ("Data is
frequently imperfect in ways that allow these algorithms to inherit the prejudices of prior decision
makers.")-in both sentencing and bail decisions; see, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf,
Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing Transparency and Predictability, and (Possibly)
Bridging the Gap Between Sentencing Knowledge and Practice, 25 GEO. MASON L. REv. 653, 654
(2018); Laurel Eckhouse et al., Layers of Bias: A UnifiedApproachfor UnderstandingProblems with
Risk Assessment, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 185 (2019).
"

&

96

There is no disputing the conclusion of Professors Janus and Prentky that "[t]o a greater or lesser
extent, all ARA [actuarial risk assessment] instruments have shortcomings, and these shortcomings
detract from the reliability of the instruments." Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use
ofActuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility andAccountability, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1443, 1472 (2003). As we discuss below, there are significant concerns regarding
racial bias in the use of predictive algorithms; see, e.g., Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal
Procedure: How to Unlock the Potentialof Big Data in Our CriminalJustice System, 2016 MIcH.
ST. L. REv. 947, 980 (2016) ("[I]f the underlying data is discriminatory, then the results that are
based on that data will be discriminatory, and the supposedly color-blind algorithms will be doing
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"a psychopath." 97 But in no case is there any consideration of the discriminations
between the categories of ASPD and psychopathy.
Our research has unearthed only one trial level, state case, in which an expert
98
witness's testimony reflects such discrimination. In Willie Y. v. State, an expert
witness explained "that psychopathy overlaps to a degree with ASPD, but is different
99
in that it can be quantified through PCL-R scoring and is less common." Clearly,
the distinctions that we are discussing in this Article are not relevant to most decisions in this area of the law.
It is also important to consider how prosecutors can and do regularly "latch
on" to psychopathy and/or ASPD as a rationale for seeking the death penalty in
capital cases.100 As Professor O. Carter Snead has noted, jurors are likely to be receptive to such arguments because of the correlation between these diagnoses and
recidivist violence. 101 This labeling has proven to be a highly effective strategy for
prosecutors given that the diagnostic criteria for each sound to the lay juror essentially like a straightforward description of "irreparable corruption" and "that no re1 02 The use of
habilitation is possible and that future criminal violence is inevitable."

nothing more than reinforcing the existing racial bias in the criminal justice system.").
1 Fell, 531 F.3d at 226. Because defendant ultimately chose not to introduce a mental health
expert, this testimony was not presented to the jury during the penalty phase of the defendant's
murder trial. Id.
98 Willie Y. v. State, No. CA2015-001060, slip op. at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 15, 2016).
"9 Id. As of the writing of this Article, the Willie Y. case has only been cited in one other
case, and that on a different point. See Glenn T. v. State, No. CA2015-001819, slip op. at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2016). It has not been discussed at all in the scholarly literature.
100 As a result, counsel may decline to present an expert witness in such a case for fear of this
precise result "as the prejudice seems to outweigh any benefit." Thi, supra note 8, at 178; see also
United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 825 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding failure to allow defendant's
expert to testify in rebuttal as to psychopathy evidence was not harmless error because error may
have a "devastating effect on a defendant"); Reed v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217,
1248 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining evidence of an antisocial personality disorder or narcissistic
personality disorder is more harmful than mitigating).
Empirical evidence suggests that it is relatively rare for the defense to call an expert mental health
witness to proactively introduce PCL-R evidence in criminal cases. John F. Edens & Jennifer Cox,
Examining the Prevalence, Role and Impact of Evidence RegardingAntisocial Personality, Sociopathy
and Psychopathy in Capital Cases: A Survey ofDefense Team Members, 30 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 239,
248 (2012).
1 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of CapitalPunishment, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1265, 1326-27 (2007). In cases involving Black defendants, this may be heightened.
Smith, supra note 47, at 1200-02.
102 Snead, supra note 101, at 1327 (quoting Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy,
Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy: Diagnostic Dilemmas in Classifying Patterns of
Antisocial Behavior in Sentencing Evaluations, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 333, 333 (1998)); see also
Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 530 ("[N]o competent capital defense attorney would ever
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these labels is part of a "pathway of dehumanization"; 103 as Kathy Wayland and Sean
O'Brien have noted, "[i]f left unchallenged in a capital case, ASPD and related constructs are quite literally the 'kiss of death."' "' In fact, the most recent research confirms that individuals who rated a criminal defendant as more psychopathic (regardless of his mental condition) were more likely to support death verdicts. 105
This is especially important when we look at this in the context of racism in
the criminal justice system and at the question of how statistical algorithms have
been charged with the perpetuation of racial bias. 106 There are significant concerns
about racial bias in the use of predictive algorithms in the criminal justice system in
general.1 07 And this is not new. Almost 50 years ago, a prominent forensic psychologist concluded (in a study of referrals for competency to stand trial evaluations) that

pursue a diagnosis of ASPD or label his client a psychopath in mitigation of punishment.").
On the question of counsel's judgment in calling or not calling an expert witness in such cases,
see, for example, Allred v. State, 186 So. 3d 530, 535 (Fla. 2016) (holding no error under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984) (constitutional standard for determining
effectiveness of counsel) where counsel declined to call mental health expert whose diagnosis
would have been antisocial personality disorder "or possibly" that defendant was "a psychopath
or sociopath"); Hampton v. Ryan, No. CV-14-02504-PHX-ROS, 2019 WL 979896, at *3-4 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 28, 2019) (finding counsel's decision to not introduce evidence of defendant's antisocial
personality disorder not violative of Strickland). But compare Clark v. Chappell, 936 F.3d 944,
976 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting "trial counsel's tactical decision to put on a witness who had
diagnosed Clark with ASPD, rather than stress a possible borderline personality disorder, is
entitled to great deference"), with Carter v. Bogan, 900 F.3d 754, 778 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding
counsel not per se ineffective, at penalty phase of capital murder trial, in presenting evidence of
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), as part of catchall statutory mitigating factor).
103 See Smith, supra note 47, at 1190 n.251 (discussing Susan T. Fiske, From
Dehumanization and Objectification, to Rehumanization: Neuroimaging Studies on the Building
Blocks of Empathy, 1167 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 31 (2009)).
M Wayland & O'Brien, supranote 2, at 526-27.
105 Tiffany N. Truong et al., Does Psychopathy Influence Juror Decision-Making in Capital

Murder Trials? "The Devil Is in the (Methodological) Details," CRIM. JusT. & BEHAV.
(forthcoming 2021) (abstract accessible at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/

0093854820966369).
'0'
Joseph J. Avery & Joel Cooper, Racial Bias in Post-Arrest and PretrialDecision Making:
The Problem and a Solution, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257, 282-83 (2019); see also Joseph
J. Avery, An Uneasy Dance with Data:RacialBias in CriminalLaw, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT
28, 31 n.21(2020) (citing Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's DisparateImpact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 680 (2016)); Jessica M. Eaglin, PredictiveAnalytics'PunishmentMismatch, 14
I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SoC'Y 87, 102-03 (2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, TransparentPredictions,
2013 U. ILL. L. REv. 1503, 1520-21(2013) (arguing that "automated prediction can lead to illegal

discrimination" based on personal attributes such as race).
107 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms, 26 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 289 n.11 (2017) ("The concern about racial bias in algorithmic software
is becoming prevalent."). For the most recent research, see Vincent Southerland, The Intersection
of Race andAlgorithmic Tools in the CriminalLegal System, 80 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
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108
Altpsychopathology was overestimated in cases involving Black defendants.
hough the issue of racial bias in the context of expert testimony on ASPD and psychopathy has not been well researched, 109 available research suggests there are important differences in the performance of African Americans and Caucasians on the
PCL-R, and that certain PCL-R items appear to be particularly subject to race
bias.110 Thus, Professor Sean O'Brien and Dr. Kathleen Wayland note that "[i]t is
difficult to imagine that implicit racial bias does not come into play when the de11
fendant is labeled 'antisocial' or 'psychopathic."' ' And this is not new: More than
25 years ago, researchers studying the PCL-R concluded that "the numerous sources
of potential differences between Black and White subjects strongly indicates the

need for further investigation." 112
Consider also the role of neuroimaging in the context of the presence of racial
bias. The late Professor Andrew Taslitz, by way of example, has pointed out that
neuroimaging has revealed that the amygdala, "a brain structure activated by threats,
increases activity when white observers, especially those harboring high levels of racial bias, observe [B]lacks but not whites." 11 3 Multiple neuroimaging experiments
"seek to identify neural correlates of unconscious racial bias.""4 Scholars have yet

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3797102.
108 Gerald Cooke et al., A Comparison of Blacks and Whites Committedfor Evaluation of
Competency to Stand Trial on Criminal Charges, 2 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 319 (1974).
109 As specifically noted in Sean D. O'Brien & Kathleen Wayland, Implicit Bias and Capital
Decision-Making: Using Narrativeto Counter PrejudicialPsychiatric Labels, 43 HOFSTRA L. REv.

751, 768 n.97 (2015).
10 David Freedman, PrematureReliance on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Violence Risk
and ThreatAssessment, 1 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT 53, 58-59 (2001). Cf Jennifer L. Skeem et al.,
Are There Ethnic Differences in Levels ofPsychopathy?A Meta-Analysis, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 505,
516 (2004) (in relation to core interpersonal and affective traits of psychopathy, there is no
evidence that Black people are more psychopathic than whites).

" O'Brien & Wayland, supra note 109, at 767; see also id. at 768 (" [E]xperimental evidence
supports concerns that jurors are more likely to perceive a black defendant as having 'antisocial'
or 'psychopathic' traits.").
12 Carl B. Gacono & Heidi E. Hutton, Suggestions for the Clinicaland Forensic Use of the
Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), 17 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 303, 314 (1994).

&

13 Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome
Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the CriminalJustice System?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 315, 355 (2012).
On how neuroimaging data can measure racial bias, see, for example, Harrison A. Korn et al.,
Neurolaw: Differential Brain Activity for Black and White Faces Predicts Damage Awards in
HypotheticalEmployment Discrimination Cases, 7 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 398, 407 (2012).
114 Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J. L.
MED. 433, 452 (2007), citing Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on IndirectMeasures ofRace
EvaluationPredictsAmygdalaActivation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 729 (2006); Mary
E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, ControllingRacialPrejudice:Social-Cognitive GoalsAffectAmygdala
and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 57 (2005); William A. Cunningham et al.,
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to explore the connection between these findings and the issues of prediction and
punishment that are at the core of this Article. 5
Related to this is the occurrence of racial bias in psychiatric diagnoses in general. We have known for decades that, by way of example, patients with a psychotic
affective disorder are more likely to be misdiagnosed as having schizophrenia if they
are Black rather than if they are white. 116 Of special relevance to the topic we are
discussing: "behavior by African-Americans is more often interpreted as 'dangerous'
than identical behavior by whites." 117 These racial disparities extend to evaluations
of whether Blacks in inpatient settings are malingering. 118 Similarly, when controlling for other factors, Black defendants were more likely to be evaluated by forensic
examiners as having a mental disease or defect.119
It is important to stress that there is valid and reliable evidence showing that
jurors are more likely to perceive a Black defendant as having "antisocial" or "psychopathic" traits. 20 Given the powerful and pervasive effect of implicit racial bias,

Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCi. 806,
806 (2004).
"5 There are other not insignificant findings about the use of neuroimaging that may be
collaterally relevant to the racial bias issues explored in this Article. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of
Neurology, Researchers Find Racial Disparities in Care for Epilepsy at Hospitals, NEUROLOGY
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2011), https://journals.lww.com/neurotodayonline/Fulltext/2011/01060/
Researchers_Find_Racial_Disparities_in_Care_for.1 .aspx (reporting a finding that "blacks and
Hispanics were less likely to receive neuroimaging or to be admitted to the hospital when seen in
their tertiary care emergency department (ED) for an epileptic seizure").
116 Howard N. Garb, Race Bias, Social Class Bias, and Gender Bias in ClinicalJudgment, 4
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 99, 101, 104 (1997); Thomas W. Pavkov et al., Psychiatric Diagnoses and
RacialBias: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 20 PROF. PSYCHOL. 364, 364, 368 (1989).
17 Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tollingfor the Aching Ones Whose Wounds

Cannot Be Nursed' The Marginalizationof RacialMinorities and Women in InstitutionalMental
DisabilityLaw, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 431, 439 (2017) (citing Sandra Graham & Brian S.
Lowery, Priming Unconscious RacialStereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
483, 483, 500 (2004) and James W. Hicks, Ethnicity, Race, andForensicPsychiatry:Are We ColorBlind?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 21, 23 (2004)).
1

Sade Udoetuk et al., Racial and GenderDisparitiesin Diagnosis ofMalingeringin Clinical

Settings, 7 J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 1117, 1 118 (2020) (malingering diagnosis

was twice as prevalent among Blacks compared with whites); see also Dewey G. Cornell & Gary
L. Hawk, ClinicalPresentationof MalingerersDiagnosedby ExperiencedForensicPsychologists, 13 L.
& HUM. BEHAv. 375, 382 (1989) (same).
"9 Ann Dirks-Linhorst et al., The Role of Race in Court-Ordered Pretrial Psychiatric
Evaluations, 16 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 225, 228 (2018).

12 See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation
of PrejudiceAgainst Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
201, 212-13 (2001).
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the use of prejudicial psychiatric labels to a minority defendant is especially dangerous. 121 As one commentator has noted, "[e]vidence that psychopathy may not manifest itself the same way in every race is similarly troubling because it raises questions
about the PCL-R's ability to consistently measure the underlying construct of psy22
chopathy across different populations."1

IV. THE PSYCHOPATHY VS. ASPD DEBATE-THE "INSIDE BASEBALL"
In this context, it is critical to consider efforts undertaken by Robert Hare to
suppress scholarly papers that have taken issue with his use of his self-created psychopathy checklist. 123 Hare's Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) is a widely
recognized diagnostic tool that identifies three areas in which psychopaths manifest
personality traits: interpersonal defects like grandiosity and deceitfulness, affective
24
Antisocial
deficits like lack of empathy, and impulsive and criminal behaviors.
personality disorder, on the other hand, overlaps to some extent with psychopathy
but is characterized by a history of criminal, often violent, behavior, which is not
5
seen to the same extent in Hare's construct of psychopathy.12

Legally, this is of great significance. PCL scores have been used to "justify
harsher sentences, transfers of youth to adult court, longer parole ineligibility periods, and capital sentencing."1 26 Research suggests that the mere introduction of the

12]
122
123

O'Brien & Wayland, supra note 109, at 768 n.97.
Ells, supra note 15, at 190 (footnotes omitted).
John Travis, Paper on Psychopaths, Delayed by Legal Threat, Finally Published, SCIENCE

&

(June 10, 2010, 2:08 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2010/06/paper-psychopathsdelayed-legal-threat-finally-published.
124 The PCL-R is far from the only diagnostic tool used in these contexts; see, e.g., Jay P.
Singh et al., A Comparative Study of Violence Risk Assessment Tools: A Systematic Review and
MetaregressionAnalysis of 68 Studies Involving 25,980 Participants,31 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV.
499, 502 (2011) (listing it as one of nine tools "used most often in the context of forensic risk
assessment"). There are hundreds of risk assessment tools available, see Jay P. Singh, Five
Opportunitiesfor Innovation in Violence Risk Assessment Research, 1 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT
MGMT. 179, 179 (2014), and it is estimated that there are, on average, 17 new such articles about
the use of such tools monthly. Id.
'25 For more on the distinctions between psychopathy and ASPD, see Robert D. Hare, Hare
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (2nd Edition) (PCL-R), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCH. & L. 348
(Brian L. Cutler ed., 2008); R.J.R. Blair, Neurocognitive Models of Aggression, the Antisocial
PersonalityDisorders, and Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROLOLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 727,
727 (2001) [hereinafter Blair, Neurocognitive Model].
The most recent research has found that, in a sample of female offenders, higher levels of
impulsivity are associated with ASPD, whereas lower levels of impulsivity was associated with
psychopathy. See Nicholas D. Thomson et al., The Habitual Female Offender Inside: How
Psychopathic Traits Predict ChronicPrison Violence, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 257, 258 (2016).
126 See, e.g., Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal
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PCL-R into evidence during a trial could cause undue prejudice against the defendant.1 27 And, importantly, race-along with gender and age-can taint alleged objectivity in these circumstances. 128 There is little question that "racial bias plays a
significant role in predictions of future dangerousness in capital cases for black defendants." 129
The use of the PCL-R is also an issue in cases involving sex offender commitment statutes. Some states, by way of example, require that the PCL-R be given
during psychological evaluations in determining whether the defendant meets statutory criteria.130
Given the seriousness of these psycho-legal determinations, it is essential that
clinicians and legal decision makers consider risk and protective factors beyond reliance on a score on one actuarial test that claims to accurately predict psychopathy

CapitalSentencing:Individualization, Generalization, Relevance, and Scientific Standards, 29 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 513 (2002); Ivan Zinger & Adelle E. Forth, Psychopathy and Canadian
CriminalProceedings:The PotentialforHuman Rights Abuses, 40 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 237,
244-48 (1998) (as discussed in Anne-Marie R. Leistico et al., A Large-Scale Meta-Analysis Relating
the HareMeasures ofPsychopathy to Antisocial Conduct, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 28, 40 (2008)). On
the "guise of objectivity" in risk assessments, see Jereny Isard, Under the Cloak of Brain Science:
Risk Assessments, Parole, and the Powerful Guise of Objectivity, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 1223, 1247
(2017).
127 See, e.g., John F. Edens et al., Effects of Psychopathy and Violence Risk Testimony on Mock
JurorPerceptionsof Dangerousnessin a CapitalMurder Trial, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 393, 396,
403 (2004).
128 See Michael Tonry, Predictions of Dangerousness in Sentencing; Dejd Vu All Over Again,
48 CRIME & JUST. 439, 450 (2019); see also Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness:
The Use ofNarrativeto Neutralize CapitalJurors'Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REv. 305,
318, 320 (2012) (citing Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1515 n.117
(2005)) (Subjects are more likely to interpret ambiguous expressions and gestures as aggressive
and hostile when the expressions and gestures are performed by Black (as opposed to white)
characters.). On the role of specific demographic variables in identifying high-risk groups of
offenders in this context, see Ryan Botha et al., Psychopathy and Its Association with Demographic
Variables in a South African Female Offender Context, 29 ACTA CRIMINOLOGICA 1, 2 (2016).
29 Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REv.
1633, 1662 (2019).
'3
John F. Edens, Misuses of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court Two Case
Examples, 16J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1082, 1085 (2001), as discussed in Leistico et al., supra
note 126, at 40. In Texas, by way of example, "[t]he expert [in a sexually violent predator
commitment case] shall make a clinical assessment based on testing for psychopathy, a clinical
interview, and other appropriate assessments and techniques to aid the department in its
assessment." TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. g 841.023(a) (West 2015). For cases in which
the PCL was administered to potential sex offenders, see, for example, In re Commitment of
Alvarado, No. 09-13-00217-CV, 2014 WL 1285136, at *9 (Tex. App. Mar. 27, 2014); In re
Commitment of Smith, No. 09-15-00091-CV, 2015 WL 7566577, at *4 (Tex. App. Nov. 25,
2015); In re Commitment of Waite, No. 09-15-00364-CV, 2016 WL 2594843, at *3 (Tex. App.

May 5, 2016).
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when attempting to predict future behaviors. As Professor Anne-Marie Leistico and
her colleagues have concluded, "[g]iven the seriousness of these psycho-legal determinations, we must recommend that clinicians and legal decision makers consider
risk and protective factors beyond psychopathy when attempting to predict future
behaviors." 13 1By way of example, more recently, the first study to examine the field
reliability and validity of PCL-R scores in Belgium concluded that "the PCL-R in
real world settings conducted by real world raters in Belgium is fairly unreliable." 132
The director of an Institute of Theoretical Psychiatry and Neuroscience in the Netherlands has thus written: "The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised appears not to be a
reliable tool for prediction of future violent behavior and recidivism in psychopaths
133
Jaymes
and should therefore be officially declared .. . an unsound instrument."
Fairfax-Columbo and Professor David DeMatteo are blunter: "[I]t is quite likely
that PCL-R-based future dangerousness evidence is not 'the product of reliable principles and methods."'1 34 The most recent systematic review agrees, noting that "[w]e

131 Leistico et al., supra note 126, at 40; see also id. ("Predicting recidivism or institutional
maladjustment differs from many clinical predictions in the obvious implications for both the
individual (e.g., abridgement of personal freedoms) and society (e.g., community safety).").
Leistico and her colleagues conclude that; at best, the PCL-R as an instrument was a "moderately"
good predictor of future psychopathic behavior. Id. at 28. Beyond the scope of this Article is
another critical issue: the extent to which the use of the PCL as a tool of predicting future behavior
in the context of risk assessments "greatly increase[s]" the potential for imprecision in forensic
evidence as it expands the gulf between inferences about groups and inferences about individuals.
See David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of DiagnosticPrecisionand Predictive Utility
in the Individual Case:A Challengefor ForensicPractice, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 259, 260 (2010).
132 Inge Jeandarme et al., PCL-RField Validity in Prisonand HospitalSettings, 41 L. & HUM.

&

BEHAV. 29, 37 (2017). The authors of this study did concede, however, that there was some
evidence of modest to moderate predictive validity for Factor 2 scores that relate to irresponsibility
and poor behavioral controls. Id.; see David DeMatteo et al., Statement of ConcernedExperts on the
Use of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in CapitalSentencing to Assess Risk for Institutional
Violence, 26 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 133, 143 (2020).
It is also important to stress that that adjusting actuarial risk with clinical judgment was taken into
consideration by mock jurors only when it increased the risk estimate, not when it diminished it.
See Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss, The Effect ofAdjustedActuarialRisk Assessment on MockJurors' Decisions in a Sexual Predator Commitment Proceeding, 53 JURIMETRICS 395, 400-01
(2013) (discussed in this context in Jefferson C. Knighton et al., How Likely Is "Likely to Reoffend"
in Sex Offender Civil Commitment Trials?, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 301 (2014)).
133 Willem H. J. Martens, The Problem with Robert Hare's Psychopathy Checklist: Incorrect
Conclusions, High Risk of Misuse, and Lack of Reliability, 27 MED. & L. 449, 455 (2008); see also
id. ("The conclusions that are drawn by Hare with regard to treatability on basis of the scores of
his PCL-R are incorrect, unethical and harmful."); DeMatteo et al., supra note 132, at 143 ("[T]he
predictive validity of PCL-R scores is inadequate to support its use as a tool to assess risk for serious
institutional violence.").
134 Jaymes Fairfax-Colombo & David DeMatteo, Reducing the Dangers of Future
Dangerousness Testimony: Applying the FederalRules of Evidence to CapitalSentencing, 25 WM.
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found that widespread beliefs about PCL psychopaths and treatment were not empirically justified[,]"" and adding: "We found no evidence of PCL psychopathy
being predictive of treatment and rehabilitation outcomes. We found no evidence
136
of PCL psychopathy being predictive of a lack of conscience."
The authors of the just-quoted article, in fact, found that many reviewers of
PCL psychopaths have more recently been "optimistic" about treatability, compared
with older reviews.137 Authors and researchers discussing treatability often looked at
qualifier variables such as appropriate treatment strategies, sufficient resources, and
staff training.138 This basis for success plays directly into whether individuals are in
a system with the appropriate resources to treat; many speculations can be made
about how marginalized populations may be less likely to land in a system which
diagnoses, treats, and rehabilitates with the appropriate resources and staffing.
Importantly, there continues to be debate about the components of a psychopathy diagnosis, with some researchers, such as Professors Jennifer Skeem and David
Cooke, concluding that criminality is merely a correlate of psychopathy, rather than
an ingrained component necessary for clinical diagnosis.1 39 Central to Skeem's criticism is her objection that the PCL-R does not actually measure what it purports to

MARY BILL RTs. J. 1047, 1070 (2017) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702, and citing Murrie et al., supra
note 15, at 352, and Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are ForensicExperts Biased by the Side that Retained
Them?, 24 PSYCHOL. ScI. 1889, 1895-96 (2013)) (finding that when rating the same offenders,
evaluators who believed they were hired by the prosecution assigned higher PCL-R scores to the
offender than did evaluators who believed they were hired by the defense). For Professor
DeMatteo's most recent research in the death penalty context, concluding that the "PCL-R cannot
make predictions that an individual will engage in serious institutional violence with any
reasonable degree of precision or accuracy and should not be used for this purpose in capital
sentencing evaluations[,]" see David DeMatteo et al., Statement of ConcernedExperts on the Use of
the HarePsychopathy Checklist-Revised in CapitalSentencing to Assess Risk for Institutional Violence,
26 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 133, 134 (2020).
'
Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen et al., Are Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) Psychopaths Dangerous,
Untreatable, and Without Conscience?A Systematic Review of the EmpiricalEvidence, 26 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 297, 305 (2020); see also Patrick J. Kennealy et al., Do Core Interpersonaland
Affective Traits of PCL-R Psychopathy Interact with AntisocialBehavior and Disinhibition to Predict
Violence?, 22 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 569, 569 (2010) (The belief that psychopaths are
"remorseless predators who use charm, intimidation and, if necessary, impulsive and cold-blooded
violence to attain their ends," is "more consistent with public perceptions of psychopathy ... than
empirical evidence.").
136 Larsen et al., supra note 135, at 305.

137 Id. at 302.
138 Id.
'3

Skeem & Cooke, supra note 10, at 439, 442. As a result of the work done by Professors
Skeem and Cooke, there has been a movement to develop more varied instruments for use in
community samples to assess variations in the core personality features of psychopathy among
adolescents and adults. See, e.g., James V. Ray et al., Correspondence Between the Psychopathic
Personality Inventory and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised: A Look at Self-Reported
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measure-the mental disorder of psychopathy. 140 Rather, it measures nothing more
than a tendency toward criminal behavior,1 41 and "overemphasizes" the role of such
behavior. 142 She has elsewhere concluded that "contemporary measures of psychopathy, including the PCL-R, appearto evidence no specialpowersin predicting violence
or other crime."143
Hare adamantly opposed this criticism and demanded that Skeem and Cooke
eliminate this point (among others) from a draft of their article before publishing it.
When Skeem and Cooke refused to comply with Hare's demand, he threatened to

sue them-and the editor ofthe journalthataccepted their article-fordefamation.144

Personality Traits, 38 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 375, 376 (2011). Hare's work has also been criticized
elsewhere. See, e.g., Martens, supra note 133, at 455.
The PCL-R has also been criticized because of its alleged inapplicability to nonincarcerated
populations. See, e.g., Scott O. Lilienfeld, Methodological Advances and Developments in the
Assessment ofPsychopathy, 36 BEHAV. REs. & THERAPY 99, 103 (1998), as discussed in Tasha R.
Phillips et al., Further Development and Construct Validation of MMPI-2-RF Indices of Global
Psychopathy, Fearless-Dominance, and Impulsive-Antisociality in a Sample of Incarcerated Women,
38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 34, 103 (2014).
140 Astonishingly, to our thinking, this article by Skeem and Cooke has only, until now,
been cited once in a law review article. See Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 549 n.177. On
the other hand, it has apparently been cited a staggering 680 times in other scholarly articles. See
4 4
GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=4066 2 898217515480&as_sdt=
5,31&sciodt=0,31&hl=en (last visited May 26, 2021) (showing citations).
141 Skeem & Cooke, supra note 10, at 442; see also Nicole Sherretts et al., Exposure to
CriminalEnvironment and CriminalSocial Identity in a Sample ofAdult Prisoners: The Moderating
Role of Psychopathic Traits, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 430, 437 (2016) (noting "antisocial tendencies
may be a consequence rather than an integral part of a psychopathic personality") (quoting among
others, Skeem & Cooke, supra note 10).
142 Shannon Toney Smith et al., "So, What Is a Psychopath?"Venireperson Perceptions, Beliefs,
and Attitudes About Psychopathic Personality, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 490, 491 (2014); see also
Phillips et al., supra note 139, at 34-35 (discussing concerns raised by the Hare scale "focus on
criminal behavior").
'43 Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Psychopathic Personality: Bridging the Gap Between Scientifc
Evidence and PublicPolicy, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 95, 96 (2011) (emphasis added); see
also Glen D. Walters, Psychopathyand Crime: Testing the Incremental Validity of PCL-R-Measured
Psychopathy as a Predictor of General and Violent Recidivism, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 404, 409
contention that
(2012) (reporting on research that "lend[s] support to Skeem and Cooke's ...
antisociality may be more a consequence than a core feature of psychopathy"); id. ("Findings from
the current study bring into serious question long-standing assumptions about psychopathy and
the PCL-R."); Kennealy et al., supra note 135, at 569 (noting research challenges "common
assumptions about the interactive relationship assumed to exist between the PCL-R factor scores
and violence").
Ken Levy, DangerousPsychopaths: Criminally Responsible but Not Morally Responsible,
Subject to CriminalPunishment and to Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1299, 1315
(2011).
144
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As Professor Levy has noted, "this move itself spawned a flurry of literature over not
45
only the merits of the PCL-R but also academic freedom more generally."1
So, there is more at stake here than dueling professors expressing differing
points of view.146

V. THE BRAIN, PUNISHMENT, RECIDIVISM, AND RACIAL BIAS
While research continues to uncover both differences and similarities in the
neurological and genetic factors that may predispose individuals to exhibit either
sociopathic or psychopathic diagnostic traits, 147 it is important to take a step back
and review how these criteria have been, and are currently, being used. It is even
more important to focus on how these criteria have been misusedin order to perpetuate dangerous race-based stereotypes, disadvantage already-marginalized populations, and contribute to the growing prison and jail figures disproportionately dominated by Black and brown men. 148
Much of the research done in this area has not taken these factors into account,
and now must be revisited in order to review findings with a more nuanced gaze
that recognizes racial and socioeconomic factors underlying environment and
learned behavior that may have been used in the past to perpetuate stereotypes.
Consider, for example, the differences between reactive and instrumental aggression. In 2001, Dr. James Blair began writing about the neurocognitive differences between psychopathy and sociopathy.1 49 He noted that there were key differences in what type of violent behavior was manifested in the two groups, and
identified two forms of aggression that are distinguished in individuals who commit
violent acts: reactive aggression elicited in response to frustration/threat and goal
directed, instrumental aggression. " Some researchers argue that different forms of
neurocognitive model are necessary to explain the emergence of these different forms

1 Id. See also, e.g., Norman Poythress & John P. Petrila, PCL-R Psychopathy: Threats to Sue,
Peer Review, and PotentialImplicationsfor Science and Law. A Commentary, 9 INT'L J. FORENSIC
MENTAL HEALTH 3, 4 (2010), discussed in this context in Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 2, at

558 n.234 (noting "litigation threats can have chilling effects on academic freedom").
146 To the best of our knowledge, no reported case has, as of yet, considered the Skeem and
Cooke article (WESTLAW search last conducted Mar. 26, 2021).

147 See, e.g., Omer Faruk Demirel et al., NeurologicalSoft Signs in AntisocialMen and Relation
with Psychopathy, 240 PSYCHIATRY RES. 248, 249 (2016).
'48
See, e.g., Emma Luttrell Shreefter, FederalFelon-In-Possession Gun Laws: Criminalizinga
Status, DisparatelyAffecting Black Defendants, and Continuing the Nation's Centuries-OldMethods
to Disarm Black Communities, 21 CUNY L. REv. 143, 157-58 (2018); Arthur H. Garrison,
DisproportionateIncarcerationofAfrican Americans: What History and the First Decade of TwentyFirst Century Have Brought, 11

'4
1

J.

INST. JUST. INT'L STUD. 87, 92 (2011).

Blair, NeurocognitiveModels, supra note 125, at 727.
Id.
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of aggression.151 Impairments in executive emotional systems (the somatic marker
system or the social response reversal system) are related to reactive aggression shown
152
Imby patients with "acquired sociopathy" due to orbitofrontal cortex lesions.
pairment in the capacity to form associations between emotional unconditioned
stimuli, particularly distress cues, and conditioned stimuli (the violence inhibition
mechanism model) is related to the instrumental aggression shown by persons with
developmental psychopathy. 153
At this point in time, no one can seriously dispute that unconscious racial stereotypes may influence judgments about offenders' "negative traits, culpability, risk
of recidivism and deserved punishment[,]"1 54 including their propensity to commit
certain kinds of offenses. In one astounding study, probation officers who were exposed to subliminal messages (words such as "homeboy" and "rap"), judged alleged
offenders "to be less immature and more violent . . . more culpable, more likely to
reoffend, and more deserving of punishment," with more negative global trait ratings.155 And consider how what we know about attitudes towards "psychopathy"
and "anti-social personality disorder" relates to punishment: How do we punish

For a more recent review of cognitive neuroscience models of psychopathy, including
151
findings on decreased amygdala responses and orbitofrontal cortex responses, see R.J.R. Blair,
Neuroimaging of Psychopathy and Antisocial Behavior: A Targeted Review, 12 CURRENT
PSYCHIATRY REP. 76 (2012) [hereinafter Blair, Neuroimaging of Psychopathy]. On brain
development, cognitive functioning and psychopathy, see James H. Fallon, The Relationship
Between Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning and Accountability Under the Law:
NeuroanatomicalBackground to Understandingthe Brain of the Young Psychopath, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRiM. L. 341, 350 (2006). For the most recent review of the relationship between legal and moral
judgments in the neurocognitive context, see Qun Yang et al., When Morality Opposes the Law:
An fMRI Investigation into Punishment Judgments for Crimes with Good Intentions, 127
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 195, 195-96 (2019).
152 Blair, NeuroimagingofPsychopathy, supra note 151, at 728.
153 Blair, Neurocognitive Models, supra note 125.
154 Patricia Soung, Socialand Biological Constructionsof Youth: Implicationsfor
Juvenile Justice

&

and Racial Equity, 6 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 428, 437 (2011). Although Prof. Suong's article
focuses on young offenders, there can be little question that these insights apply to all. Graham
Lowery, supra note 117, at 499.
1 Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in
America, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 311 (2012) (citing Graham & Lowery, supra note
117, at 496 (alteration in original)).
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people differently based on perceived propensity to commit certain types of offenses,
a perception of propensity that may be race based?' 56
The DSM, and clinical judgment, has long been viewed as a potentially inherently racist system of classifying mental illness. "7 This may be particularly true for
Black men diagnosed with ASPD and thus "written off' as too violent or dangerous
for any path other than maximum prison sentences. 158 This diagnosis, compounded
by stereotyping, will continue to divert marginalized individuals from therapeutic,
treatment-focused programs if not recognized and addressed by judges and prosecutors. Clinical professionals must also recognize their own biases in how they make
their diagnoses and clinical judgments. 159

VI. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE' 60
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past three
decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence

156 See, e.g., Carlos Berdej6, CriminalizingRace: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining,
59
B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018) (discussing how prosecutors may be using race as a proxy for a
defendant's latent criminality (such as propensity to commit a severe offense in the future) in cases
involving low-level offenses).

&

157 Harold W. Neighbors et al., Racial Diferences in DSM Diagnosis Using a Semi-Structured
Instrument- The Importance of CLinicalJudgment in the Diagnosis ofAfrican Americans, 43 J. HEALTH
Soc. BEHAV. 237, 237 (2003).
158 See, e.g., Colleen M. Berryessa & Barclay Wohlstetter, The Psychopathic "Label" and
Effects on Punishment Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis, 43 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 9, 20 (2019) (noting
[are] traditionally associated with negative stigma, such as
"antisocial personality disorders ...
dangerousness, lack of treatability, and punitive judgments similar to psychopathy") (citing, inter
alia, Terrie E. Moffitt et al., Research Review: DSM-V Conduct Disorder: Research Needs for an
Evidence Base, 49 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 3 (2008)).

159 See, e.g., Chloe FitzGerald & Samia Hurst, Implicit Bias in Healthcare Professionals:A
Systematic Review, BMC MED. ETHICS, 2017, at 5.
'w See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, 'All His Sexless Patients" Persons with
Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REv. 257, 277 (2014)
[hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, 'All His Sexless Patients'";Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein,
"Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame": Thinking About the Law, Shame and
Humiliation, 24 So. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 1, 9 (2014); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch,
"Had to be Held Down by Big Police": A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Interactions
Between Police andPersons with MentalDisabilities,43 FoRD. URB. L.J. 685, 695 (2016); Michael
L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair':Risk, Security,
Danger, the Constitution, and the Clinician's Dilemma, 5 IND. J.L. & Soc. EQUALITY 409, 421
(2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Toiling]. It also distills the work that one of the co-authors
(Michael L. Perlin) has done on this topic for the past 27 years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin,
What Is TherapeuticJurisprudence?,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). Seegenerally Michael

L. Perlin, "Have You Seen Dignity?": The Story ofthe Development of TherapeuticJurisprudence,27
U.N.Z. L. REv. 1135 (2017); Michael L. Perlin, "Changing of the Guards": David Wexler,
TherapeuticJurisprudence,and the TransformationofLegal Scholarship, 63 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
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(TJ). 61 Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes that the law-potentially a therapeutic agent-can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for individuals involved in both the civil and criminal justice systems. 162 It asks this question: can or
should legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while, at the same time, not subordinating principles of due process? 1 63 From the outset, one of the creators of this field of scholarship/theory has
been clear: "the law's use of 'mental health information to improve therapeutic funca position with which we entioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns[,]'"
tirely agree. I65
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's
166
focusing on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological wellbeing. 167 TJ seeks to inform lawyering practices and influence policy "by using social
science data and methodology to study the extent to which a legal rule, procedure,
lives,"

3 (2019).

161

See,

e.g.,

DAVID

THERAPEUTIC AGENT

B.

WEXLER,

THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE:

8-11 (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE

J.

THE LAW AS A

WINICK, LAW IN A

THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 606 (1996); BRUCE J.
WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 6-7 (2005); David B.

Wexler, Two Decades of TherapeuticJurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 17 (2008).
62 See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanagedwith Great Skill': How Will Jurors
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009);
see Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds., 2006).

&

&

'63 Michael L. Perlin, "AndMy Best Friend,My Doctor/ Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got":
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
735, 751 (2005); Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain'"
Consideringthe SexualAutonomy Rights of Persons InstitutionalizedBecause of Mental Disability in
ForensicHospitalsand in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 510 n.139 (2008).
164 Perlin & Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients", supra note 160, at 262 (quoting David B.
Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI.
L. 17, 21 (1993)); see also, e.g., David B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED
PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 184 (1996).

"[A]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump'
civil rights and civil liberties." Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental DisabilityLaw,
Theory and Practice, "Us"and "Them ", 31 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
166 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: TherapeuticJurisprudencePerspectives on Dealing with Victims
165

of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
167 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and
Strategies, in DANIEL P. STOLLE, DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, PRACTICING
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45, 45 (Dennis P. Stolle eds.,

2000).

PSYCHOPATHY & PUNISHMENT

2021]

483

or practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects." 168 It suggests that "law should value psychological health, should strive to
avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and
wellness." 169

'

Therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law, a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach
to the practice of law which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial tri7
umphalism."1 70 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.1
Therapeutic jurisprudence and its practitioners place great importance on the
principle of a commitment to dignity. I 72 Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three
Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness, 7 3 arguing:

.

What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of
voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels
that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge
from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at

58 Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny'sin the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine":
TherapeuticJurisprudenceand ClinicalTeaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 535-34 (2000); see
also Christopher Slobogin, TherapeuticJurisprudence:Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 193, 197 (1995) (TJ "adopt[s] a preference for laws that promote well-being").
19

Bruce J. Winick, A

Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in

INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
170 Warren Brookbanks, TherapeuticJurisprudence:Conceiving an EthicalFramework, 8 J.L.
& MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to
Settlement: Challengesforthe TJLawyer, in THE AFFECTIVEASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING
LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 341, 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David
B. Wexer, The Use of TherapeuticJurisprudence in Law School ClinicalEducation: Transforming
the CriminalLaw Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006).
171 See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door?A "Therapeutic"Approach
to Enriching ClinicalLegal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006);
Brookbanks, supra note 170, at 329-30; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper:An Attempt
to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn 's Concerns About TherapeuticJurisprudence Criminal
Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007).
112 WINICK, supra note 161, at 606. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "There Are No Trials
Inside the Gates of Eden": Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of TherapeuticJurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS,
LAW AND POUCY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckleton eds., 2013).

173 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the
importance of "voice," see also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and
Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 588 (2008).
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peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive.174
This leads to a question, not addressed before in this context: To what extent
are the ways that brain science affects our modern views of punishment consonant
or dissonant with therapeutic jurisprudence? 1 75 Do they best insure that these
principles written about by Professor Ronner-the principles of voluntariness,
voice, and validation-be fulfilled in matters sentencing a population that is simultaneously feared, hated, and misunderstood? To what extent are any of Professor
Ronner's factors even relevant in a universe in which punishment is the sine qua non
17 6
of any policy judgments regarding this population?

Professor Ken Levy sets out the issue:
It seems that there is at least one way in which we can have our cake and eat
it too-one way in which we can both preventively commit psychopaths
whom we find to be dangerous (pre-crime) andcriminally punish them if they
are found guilty of crimes. The key is to recognize that psychopathy may very
well be regarded as a mental illness and therefore a condition that makes psychopaths eligible for preventive commitment (as long as they are also dangerous) but is not severe enough to be regarded as insanity (that is, is not severe

174

Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic

Jurisprudence,MirandaandJuveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89, 94-95 (2002). See generallyAMY D.
RONNER, LAw, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
175 The therapeutic jurisprudence literature has been virtually silent about this issue. But see
Perlin & Lynch, supra note 28, on the interrelationship between neuroscience and punishment
decisions in juvenile cases, and Michael L. Perlin, "I've Got My Mind Made Up": How Judicial
Teleology in Cases Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24
CARDOzo J. EQUAL RTs. & SOc. JUST. 81, 91 (2017) (noting "consider how courts regularly
ignore the reality that there is scientific evidence that instrumental violence may stem from
uncontrolled, biologically based psychopathology (amygdala dysfunction) and/or controlled
decision making that is based on anticipated environmental consequences (observational and
enactive learning of external reinforcers)").
176 For one of the few relevant considerations, see Emily R. Murphy, Paved with Good

Intentions: Sentencing Alternativesfrom Neuroscience and the Policy ofProblem-Solving Courts, 37
L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 83, 117 (2013) ("With opportunities for invasive, long-lasting, and highlyimpacting treatments coming soon from neuroscience, drug courts must revisit the true roots of a
therapeutic jurisprudence framework: a focus on empirically verifiable results with respect for due
process protections for personal liberty and autonomy."). On the relationship between therapeutic
jurisprudence and neuroscience on the question of competency to stand trial, see Michael L. Perlin
& Alison J. Lynch, 'My Brain Is So Wired" Neuroimaging'sRole in Competency Cases Involving
Persons with Mental Disabilities,27 BOSTON U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73 (2018). On this relationship in
the context of the insanity defense, see Perlin, supra note 162, at 913-14.
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enough to be considered an inability to know/appreciate right and wrong or
to act in conformity with this knowledge/appreciation).

177

Of course, this is precisely the formula that courts follow in cases involving socalled sexually violent predators. Following the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,1 78 a case about as antithetical to therapeutic jurisprudence principles as one can imagine,1 79 such an approach-preventive detention
and punishment-makes a mockery of the concepts of voice, validation, and voluntariness in every way imaginable. Some scholars acknowledge the ambiguities we
face; by way of example, Adam Fox and his colleagues have concluded, "some
punitive recourse is in order for the wrongdoing psychopath, but it does not resolve
the debate as to what may or should be done about the psychopath who has fulfilled
the retributive mandate but persists in presenting a chronic, serious danger to
others." 180
TJ also requires individualization.1 8' That is, it demands that persons subject
to legal regulation be considered as individuals, and not simply as a labeled group.
By way of example in her article about how TJ can be the "kickstart" factor in exploring how the legal process can become a medium for creating novel and effective
intervention with individuals subject to legal regulation, 182 Professor Claire Steinberger has looked to the New York state right-to-refuse treatment case of Rivers v.
Katz, 183 as an example of a case that implicitly endorsed TJ values in its criticism of

'»
Levy, supra note 144, at 1379; Shan6e Brown, Impunity for the IncorrigiblePsychopath?:
Neurobiological Abnormalities Do Not Exempt Psychopaths from Criminal Responsibility, 7
CHARLOTTE L. REv. 239, 247, 253 (2016). On psychopathy and outpatient commitment, see
Bruce J. Winick et al., Should Psychopathy Qualify for Preventive Outpatient Commitment?, in 2

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHIC DISORDERS AND THE LAW 61, 70 (Alan

Felthous & Henning Sa1F eds., 2007).
'78 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
179 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/andFailure's No Success at
All": Exposing the Pretextuality ofKansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1248-49 (1998);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN &

HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO,

SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION: THE

DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION 28-29, 145-46 (2017);
Keri K. Gould, If It's a Duck and Dangerous-PermanentlyClip Its Wings or Treat It Till It Can

Fly?: A Therapeutic Perspective on Difficult Decisions, Short-Sighted Solutions and Violent Sexual
PredatorsAfter Kansas v. Hendricks, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 859, 882 (1998); Michael L. Perlin et
al., "On Desolation Row": The Blurringof the Borders Between Civil and CriminalMental Disability
Law, and What It Meansfor All of Us, 24 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 59, 96 (2018).

ISO Fox et al., supra note 48, at 24.
181
See, e.g., Thomas F. Asbury, Spiritual Outputs Approach to Rehabilitation:Alternative
Sentencing Theory, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 41, 45 (2001) (noting TJ "deals with people ... on a more
personal, individualized basis").
182 Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic

JurisprudenceMake a Difference?, 27 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 55, 56 (2003).
18

Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (Ct. App. 1986). Rivers is discussed extensively in
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the absence of individualization of medication orders that did not incorporate the
patients' perspective into the review process. 184
Although over 20 years ago, the late Professor Bruce Winick noted that
"concern for avoiding or ameliorating psychopathology in a traditional sense .. . has
been the subject of much of the therapeutic jurisprudence literature dealing with
mental health law[,]" 185 the TJ literature has been virtually totally bereft of analyses
186
of the issues that we are focusing on in this Article. We hope that this Article will
jog interest and "kickstart" consideration of this important topic, and optimally,
might lead to a more individualized rehabilitative effort for the individuals under
discussion here. 187
Concepts from TJ that would recognize the need for such individualized treat188
and less aument could contribute to enhanced, less biased screening processes,
due
to a menwho
may,
settings
and
prison
tomatic discipline for individuals in jail
189
This
tal health diagnosis, be more likely to show violent or aggressive behavior.
could also include a different system of transfers between units or facilities, 190 so
people with a greater likelihood of using reactive aggression as a coping strategy
would have less opportunity to be placed in situations exacerbating this propensity.191

PERLIN
84

&

CUCOLO, supra note 5, § 8-6.3.1.
Steinberger, supra note 182, at 68 n.79.

&

185 Bruce Winick, The Jurisprudenceof TherapeuticJurisprudence,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y

L. 184, 192 (1997).
86 But see Bruce

J.

Winick, A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAssessment of Sexually Violent

Predator Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW,

JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 317, 318 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 2003) (observing that
sex offender policy "has fluctuated between two polar approaches," subjecting sex offenders to
criminal punishment under a criminal model and labeling them as "'sexual psychopaths"' under
an illness model), as discussed in Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty,
Protectionism,Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1397, 1442 n.284 (2009).
Apparently, the only other scholarship ever done in this area is David Carson & Christopher
Heginbotham, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Psychopathy: A PhilosophicalExploration, in PHIL.
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOPATHY 131 (Christopher Heginbotham ed., 2000).
187 Consider Chief Judge David Bazelon's admonition that we need to be vigilant about not
"overgeneraliz[ing] about citizens whom it is easy to overgeneralize about." David L. Bazelon,
Institutionalization,Deinstitutionalization,and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 897, 909

(1975).
188 There is surprisingly virtually nothing about this in the literature. But see Steven L.
Proctor et al., Response Bias in Screening County JailInmatesfor Addictions, 1 J. DRUG ISSUES 117,
119 (2011).
189 For an example, see People v. Parker, 395 P.3d 208, 225 (Cal. 2017).
See generally Perlin & Lynch, Toiling, supra note 160.
See generally Cecelia Klingele, Labeling Violence, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 855 (2020)
(commenting on reactive aggression in this context). See also Rachael A. Lickley & Catherine L.
19

191
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Again, a parallel consideration of how we deal with sexual violent predators
might be instructive. In a book on that topic, in discussing community monitoring,
one of the co-authors (Michael L. Perlin) and a colleague concluded, "[i]f we choose
to still have some form of community monitoring, it must be done through an
individualized assessment of risk, likelihood, and danger based on credible, peerreviewed studies and ethical evaluations." 9 The characterizations of a criminal defendant as a "psychopath"1 93 is as unindividualized as any legal characterization can
possibly be, and thus frontally violative of all therapeutic jurisprudence principles.
It is mandatory that we rethink these harmful and counterproductive practices.

VII. CONCLUSION
The difference between antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy has
been muddled by courts and commentators alike, a muddling that has great significance to those of us who are seeking to unpack why we punish and how advances
in neuroscience might give us some tentative answers as to what we should do. We
have hoped, in this Article, to try to resolve some of the ambiguities that appear
omnipresent, and, by doing so, we hope that we also have been able to shed some
light on a series of other interrelated issues that cannot be avoided in this conversation. The significance of implicit racial bias appears in all aspects of the ongoing
inquiries, including the use of purportedly-objective actuarial instruments and in
diagnostic labeling by clinicians. The recent valid and reliable evidence forces (or,
rather, shouldforce) courts to reconsider their slavish reliance on the use of the PCLR test. It is imperative for counsel to understand the complexity of the issues we
preliminarily discuss here, and the correlative need for counsel to apply these findings to representation of criminal defendants. It is essential to consider the application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles to all of the questions we consider in
this Article. We hope that this Article sheds some light on some of the complex
issues we face in considering these important and confounding issues, especially
those that arise in racially-explosive situations. We also hope it encourages lawyers,
judges, and expert witnesses to more judiciously consider claims made on behalf of

"

the PCL-R.

Sebastian, The Neural Basis of ReactiveAggression and Its Development in Adolescence, 24 PSYCIH OL.
CRIME & L. 313, 313 (2018).
192 PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 179, at 169 (emphasis added).
"9
See, e.g., Turner v. State, 87 S.W.3d 111, 117-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming
capital murder conviction where prosecutor referred to defendant as a psychopath and a
sociopath); Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1189 (Ind. 2001) (finding counsel for capital
murder defendant were not ineffective in failing to object to prosecutor's description of defendant
as a "psychopath" and "sociopathic" during closing argument).
9 Caleb D. Lloyd et al., Psychopathy, Expert Testimony, and Indeterminate Sentences:
Exploring the Relationship Between Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Testimony and Trial Outcome in
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Stanley Kubrick directed a movie adaptation of Anthony Burgess's novel, A
Clockwork Orange, and has famously said, "There's something in the human personality which resents things that are clear, and conversely, something which is attracted to puzzles, enigmas, and allegories." 195 Paradoxically, as a society, we have
sought to simplify this whole topic, and resist the puzzles that remain. The quote
from Clockwork Orange with which we begin our title-"I See What Is Right and
Approve, But I Do What Is Wrong"-is the essence of the ambiguity that confronts
us. We hope that this Article will be a modest step on the road towards resolution
of this ambiguity.

Canada, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 323, 326, 334 (2010).
195 Jasun Horsley, There's Something About Stanley: Kubrick's Strange Science of Obsession,
QUIETUS (Dec. 13, 2014, 10:19 AM), https://thequietus.com/articles/16888-stanley-kubrickarticle.

